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MIKE ZIMMER, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AND "A GIFT 
THAT KEEPS GIVING" 
BY 
WILLIAM R. CORBETT* 
"And with that, I am done with McDonnell Douglas on its 40th 
birthday." 
"No, Bill. McDonnell Douglas is a gift that keeps giving. We both have 
made a career out of it and I expect we can continue digging up new angles. "' 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mike Zimmer saw a way to achieve coherence, clarity, and 
symmetry in employment discrimination law even as the courts 
decided cases that increasingly made the law appear incoherent and 
chaotic. Mike could take the very decisions that were making 
discrimination law more asymmetrical and inscrutable and use them 
to weave together a holistic and sensible model. In no area was his 
gift more apparent than in individual disparate treatment law, 
particularly in attempting to impose some order on that unruly beast, 
the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis.2 If the courts had followed 
the course charted by Mike in his articles, employment discrimination 
law would be far better today. Perhaps either the courts or Congress 
or both still can and will. Mike was an optimist, and he would believe 
that today. Missing my friend, I shall pay homage to his vision for 
individual disparate treatment law, and in doing so, believe that 
Mike's vision is still achievable. 
II. A RELATIONSHIP WITH MIKE ZIMMER - A GIFT THAT KEEPS 
GIVING 
Over a period of about two decades, Mike and I wrote many 
articles about proof of disparate treatment discrimination, often 
focusing on McDonnell Douglas. I so revered Mike and valued his 
opinion and advice that I almost never submitted an article for 
consideration by journals without first sending him a draft and getting 
his feedback. Mike Zimmer was my friend, mentor, role model, and 
advisor. Since I have known him, I have wanted to "be like Mike." 3 
My relationship with Mike began in January 1995 at a conference 
at Stetson University College of Law - the Tenth Annual National 
2. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). 
3. Twenty-five years ago one of the best known commercials in television's history 
debuted. It was a Gatorade commercial featuring NBA legend Michael Jordan. See Darren 
Rovell, Famed "Be Like Mike" Gatorade Ad Debuted 25 Years Ago, ESPN (Aug. 8, 2016), 
<http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/17246999/michael-jordan-famous-mike-gatorade-commer 
cial-debuted-25-years-ago-Monday>. 
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Conference on Labor and Employment Law. At that time, Mike had 
been a professor and brilliant employment discrimination scholar for 
many years. I, on the other hand, had been teaching for just over 
three years, and I had neither published an article about employment 
discrimination law nor taught the course. At the conference Mike 
presented a paper on the uniform analysis of individual disparate 
treatment cases that he posited should emerge from the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991. My paper was about the after-acquired evidence rule, 
which was the subject of a case then pending before the U.S. Supreme 
Court.4 Mike's paper was far more ambitious and better than mine. 
His paper was the precursor to what I consider one of his best articles: 
The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment 
Discrimination Litigation, which he published in a 1996 employment 
discrimination law symposium of the Georgia Law Review. As fate 
would have it, my Stetson conference paper was the precursor to an 
article that I published in the same symposium issue.6 Mike was kind 
enough to give me helpful feedback on my paper after the Stetson 
conference, and with his help, I improved the paper and managed to 
have it included in an outstanding symposium issue that included the 
work of Mike, Rebecca Hanner White, Ann Hodges, and Susan 
Grover.' That pattern of Mike teaching me and helping me with 
scholarship would continue for two decades. I never stopped asking 
for his help, and he never stopped giving it. 
When I first taught Employment Discrimination law in 1996, 
naturally I used the wonderful case book by Mike and his co-authors 
(currently Charlie Sullivan and Rebecca White),' and I still use it. By 
using it to teach my course, I have continued to learn about 
employment discrimination law through the work of Mike and his co-
authors. 
Around 2005, Mike invited some distinguished comparative 
labor law scholars and me to work on an international and 
comparative labor law case book. 9 Although I was out of my league 
4. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995). 
5. 30 GA. L. REV. 563 (1996). 
6. William R. Corbett, The "Fall" of Summers, the Rise of "Pretext Plus," and the 
Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Employment at Will: 
Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305 (1996). 
7. That symposium afforded me my first correspondence with Professor and future Dean 
Rebecca White, who has been a friend and mentor ever since. 
8. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (8th ed. 2012). 
9. ROGER BLANPAIN ET AL., THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL AND 
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working on such a project with Mike, Roger Blanpain, Susan Bisom-
Rapp, and Hilary K. Josephs, they were patient with me, and the 
project greatly expanded my knowledge of and perspective on labor 
and employment law. 
From the time I first met Mike Zimmer until the last year of his 
life, I benefited from the friendship and mentorship of a brilliant, 
generous, and kind person. A relationship with Mike truly was a gift 
that keeps giving - even after his passing. 
III. MIKE ZIMMER'S SCHOLARSHIP: THE GIFT OF SEEKING TO 
CREATE ORDER FROM CHAOS (OR LEMONADE FROM LEMONS) 
I am a pessimist. Mike was an optimist. Our scholarship on 
disparate treatment law reflects this difference. With the rendering of 
most of the Supreme Court's decisions on disparate treatment and the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis, I became more disillusioned. Mike, on 
the other hand, could take each decision and the progression of 
decisions and craft a positive vision for development of the law.o He 
took each decision and development and laid out a plan for how each 
could be used to create a uniform and sensible body of law. The 
courts often did not follow that plan. But, channeling Mike, I will say 
now that the hope remains. Mike envisioned individual disparate 
treatment law as it should be, and that vision is worth pursuing. 
A. Brief Chronology of the Development of Individual Disparate 
Treatment Law 
Much of the development of the federal employment 
discrimination laws in the courts, and many of the Supreme Court's 
employment discrimination opinions have focused on the proof 
structures used to analyze individual disparate treatment claims." The 
COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT LAW - CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. Wolters Kluwer 2012) 
(1st ed. CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS 2007). 
10. See Jason R. Bent, Hope for Zimmerism: Overcoming the Empathy Problem in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 20 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPL. POL'Y J. 277 (2016). 
11. The Court recently reiterated its well-known nutshell on theories of discrimination in 
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). The Court explained that disparate 
treatment is "a claim that an employer intentionally treat[s] a complainant less favorably than 
employees with the 'complainant's qualifications' but outside the complainant's protected 
class." Id. at 1345. The Court also explained two other theories of discrimination - disparate 
impact, based on discriminatory effects of a facially neutral employment practice in which intent 
or motive is not required, and "pattern-or-practice" (also known as systemic disparate 
treatment), based on proof of intentional discrimination as the employer's standard operating 
procedure. See also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) 
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Supreme Court created two proof frameworks to analyze individual 
disparate treatment employment discrimination claims. The Court 
announced the pretext framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green1 2 in 1973 and the mixed-motives structure in Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkinsl3 in 1989. Although both were created by the Court, 
mixed-motives later would be modified and codified by Congress in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.14 
The McDonnell Douglas pretext framework is a three-part proof 
structure with shifting burdens of production. A plaintiff bears the 
initial burden of production to establish a prima facie case by proving 
1) that he belongs to a protected class, 2) that he applied and was 
qualified for the job, 3) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected, 
and 4) that the position remained open and the employer continued 
to seek applicants having the plaintiff's qualifications." The Court 
noted in McDonnell Douglas that the elements of the prima facie case 
will vary with different factual situations.16 If the plaintiff satisfies the 
burden of the prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the 
defendant-employer to present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for its actions.1 7 Finally, if the employer satisfies its burden at 
the second stage, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff 
to prove that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext for 
discrimination. 
The McDonnell Douglas opinion announced the proof structure, 
but the mechanics and meaning of the analysis were not fully 
developed at that time. The Court found it necessary to explain the 
meaning and procedural effect of the second and third stages of the 
analysis in several subsequent cases. These decisions include Texas 
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,19 St. Mary' s Honor 
Center v. Hicks,20 and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 21 
(explaining the differences between disparate treatment and disparate impact). 
12. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
13. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
14. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012)). 
15. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
16. Id. at 802 n.13. 
17. Id. at 802-03. 
18. Id. at 804. 
19. 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981) (explaining the defendant's burden at stage two). 
20. 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (explaining the effect of proof of pretext in a fully tried case). 
21. 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000) (explaining the effect of proof of pretext at summary judgment 
and judgment as a matter of law). 
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The decisions helped to clarify the standards and burdens of proof 
under the pretext framework, but even these decisions did not make 
the pretext framework easily applicable in all employment 
discrimination cases. 
The Supreme Court never has held that the pretext analysis is 
applicable to analyze ADEA cases (although it assumed it in 
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.22), and lower courts 
routinely have applied it. The Court seems implicitly to have 
approved the applicability of the pretext analysis to disability 
discrimination claims under the ADA in Raytheon Co. v. 
Hernandez.2 3 
The court announced the alternative proof structure, mixed 
motives, in Price Waterhouse. The plurality opinion and Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence applied different standards to the plaintiff's 
prima facie case - "motivating factor" applied by the plurality,24 and 
"substantial factor" by the concurrence. 25 After Price Waterhouse, 
most courts applied substantial factor. The second stage of the 
analysis was an affirmative defense under which a defendant could 
avoid liability by proving that it would have taken the same action for 
a nondiscriminatory reason (the same-decision defense).26 Courts also 
grappled with the issue of under which proof structure any particular 
case should be analyzed. Most circuits seized upon the dividing line 
cited by the O'Connor concurrence: cases in which there was direct 
evidence were analyzed under mixed-motives, and circumstantial 
evidence cases were analyzed under pretext. 27 The courts of appeals 
developed various definitions to distinguish direct from circumstantial 
evidence. 28 The tests were confusing and uncertain - described by a 
court that sought to put an end to the distinction as "chaos" and a 
"morass."29 
22. 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996) ("In assessing claims of age discrimination brought under the 
ADEA, the Fourth Circuit, like others, has applied some variant of the basic evidentiary 
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. We have never had occasion to decide whether that 
application of the Title VII rule to the ADEA context is correct, but since the parties do not 
contest that point, we shall assume it."). 
23. 540 U.S. 44 (2003). 
24. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989). 
25. Id. at 274 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
26. Id. at 244-45 (plurality opinion). 
27. Id. at 270-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
28. See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Charles A. 
Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 
191, 210 n.81 (2009) (collecting court decisions and articles). 
29. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 299 F.3d 838, 851-53 (9th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 539 
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Congress made some changes in at least one disparate treatment 
proof structure in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Given the splintered 
Court decision in Price Waterhouse, Congress clarified and fixed the 
mixed-motives proof structure. Congress codified "motivating factor" 
as the causation standard in the plaintiff's prima face case rather than 
"substantial factor." 3 0 Congress also changed the analysis of Price 
Waterhouse by providing that the same-decision defense is not a 
complete defense, avoiding liability. Instead, liability is still imposed 
even if the employer satisfies its burden on the same-decision 
defense, but the defense limits the remedies that are available.31 
The mixed-motives framework was developed in Price 
Waterhouse, a Title VII sex discrimination case. Courts assumed that 
it also applied to the ADEA32 and the ADA,33 although most thought 
that the Price Waterhouse version was applicable under those statutes 
because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not amend the ADEA and 
the ADA to install the modified statutory version of mixed motives. 34 
As long as courts maintained a dividing line between cases to be 
analyzed under pretext and those to be analyzed under mixed 
motives, it was reasonable for courts to continue using the two proof 
structures and the rich body of case law developed under them. 
However, the Supreme Court called into question this dichotomy 
when it held in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa that direct evidence is not 
required for a plaintiff to be entitled to a motivating factor jury 
instruction.35 With that, the Court seemingly erased the generally 
accepted line separating the cases analyzed under pretext and those 
analyzed under mixed motives. The Court based its holding on the 
fact that the language added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not 
say anything about "motivating factor" being limited to direct 
evidence cases. Even Justice O'Connor, on whose Price Waterhouse 
concurrence the distinction was based, agreed that the 1991 Act had 
U.S. 90 (2003). 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012). 
31. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The limitation is significant, leaving the plaintiff with no money. 
32. See, e.g., EEOC v. Warfield-Rohr Casket Co, Inc., 364 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2004); Rose v. 
N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 257 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001). 
33. See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 959 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(collecting cases). 
34. See, e.g., Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d 506, 512 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) 
("Because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply to ADEA cases ... we continue to apply 
the Price Waterhouse test in order to resolve ADEA cases."); Parker v. Columbia Pictures 
Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 336-37 (2d Cir. 2000) (collecting ADA cases applying Price Waterhouse 
methodology). 
35. 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003). 
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eviscerated the distinction.36 Did elimination of the dividing line mean 
that all individual disparate treatment cases were to be analyzed 
under the mixed-motives framework? The Court declined to say. 31 
The lower courts were left with no guidance on deciding what to do 
with the two disparate treatment proof structures - the McDonnell 
Douglas pretext framework and the statutory mixed-motives analysis. 
Desert Palace appeared to be a landmark development in the 
evolution of the proof frameworks for one thing that it expressly did 
and one thing that it could be read as implicitly doing. First, it 
expressly ended the division and analysis of employment 
discrimination claims based on the type of evidence (direct or 
circumstantial) on which they were based. This was a good 
development in employment discrimination law because the dividing 
line had proven to be chimerical. Second, Desert Palace could be read 
as inferentially displacing the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis 
and leaving all individual disparate treatment claims to be analyzed 
under the statutory mixed-motives framework. Because Desert Palace 
did not establish a clear new basis of demarcation between cases to be 
analyzed under the two proof frameworks, some courts38 and 
commentators3 9 suggested or argued that the McDonnell Douglas 
framework was dead. Those arguments notwithstanding, the courts 
continued to use the pretext analysis, with most never mentioning 
that Desert Palace had erased the dividing line and thereby called into 
question the continuing viability of McDonnell Douglas. Moreover, 
many courts continued to refer to the pretext analysis as being for 
cases based on circumstantial evidence and the mixed-motives 
analysis for cases based on direct evidence, saying that when a 
plaintiff presents only circumstantial evidence the case must be 
analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas analysis.40 Although it 
certainly was arguable that the pretext analysis survived Desert 
Palace, the courts that insisted upon maintaining the direct-
36. Id. at 102 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
37. In fact the Court said it would not say: "This case does not require us to decide when, if 
ever, §107 applies outside of the mixed-motives context." Id. at 94 n.1 (majority opinion). 
38. See, e.g., Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990-93 (D. Minn. 2003). 
39. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title 
VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83 (2004); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est 
Mort; Vive Le Roi!": An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the 
Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed-
Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 76 (2003); Kaitlin Picco, The Mixed-Motive Mess: 
Defining and Applying a Mixed Motive Framework, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 461 (2011). 
40. See, e.g., Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C., 778 F.3d 473, 475 (5th 
Cir. 2015); Marable v. Marion Military Inst., 595 F. App'x. 921 (1lth Cir. 2014). 
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circumstantial evidence dividing line were flouting the Court's 
decision in Desert Palace. 
In Gross v. FBL Financial Services,41 the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on the issue whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence 
of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motives instruction in a 
non-Title VII discrimination case.42 However, the Court majority, in a 
5-4 decision, stated that it had to decide a preliminary issue before 
reaching the one on which certiorari was granted: whether the burden 
of persuasion ever shifts to the defendant in an ADEA case.43 That is, 
the Court addressed the question of whether the mixed-motives 
analysis applies to claims under the ADEA. The majority rejected the 
plaintiff's reliance on decisions interpreting Title VII as controlling. 
The Court explained that it never had held that the mixed-motives 
analysis of Price Waterhouse applies to the ADEA.44 When Congress 
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it amended Title VII to add the 
mixed-motives analysis, but it did not amend the ADEA similarly.45 
Thus, with the 1991 Act, Congress created a "materially different" 
burden of persuasion in Title VII than exists in the ADEA: 
"motivating factor" in Title VII and "because of" in the ADEA.46 The 
Court therefore concluded that its interpretation of the ADEA was 
not controlled by decisions interpreting Title VII - specifically Price 
Waterhouse and Desert Palace. 
Having dispatched with the authority of Price Waterhouse and 
Desert Palace, the Court majority shifted to interpreting the text of 
the ADEA. The Court read the "because of ... age" language to 
mean that age must be the but-for cause of the employer's action.47 
The Court explained this interpretation of "because of" based on 
dictionary definitions, its opinion in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,48 a 
couple of non-employment-discrimination Court decisions 
interpreting the similar language "by reason of" and "based on," and 
a torts treatise explaining but-for causation. 49 From these sources, the 
41. 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
42. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. at 167 (2009) 
(No. 08-441), 2008 WL 4462099. 
43. Gross, 557 U.S. at 173. 
44. Id. at 174. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. ("Unlike Title VII the ADEA's text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish 
discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor."). 
47. Id. at 176-77. 
48. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
49. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176-78. 
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Court gleaned that the "ordinary" meaning of the statutory language 
"because of" is but-for causation.o 
After concluding that the standard of causation is but-for, the 
Court turned to the burden of persuasion. The Court stated that the 
default rule is that plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion, and the 
text of the ADEA indicates no exception to that default rule. 
Locking in a uniform analysis for intentional age discrimination cases, 
the Court stated that the burden of persuasion is the same in mixed-
motives cases as in other individual disparate treatment cases: the 
plaintiff must prove that age is the but-for cause of the employer's 
decision. 
In 2013, the Supreme Court extended the reach of the Gross 
decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. 
Nassar.53 In Nassar the Court held that because the anti-retaliation 
provision of Title VII (section 704(a)) 54 Uses "because of" and was not 
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the standard of causation is 
but-for, and the mixed-motives analysis is not applicable to claims 
under the anti-retaliation provision. 
So where are we in the law of individual disparate treatment at 
the end of this progression? There appear to be two analyses or proof 
frameworks applicable under Title VII's anti-discrimination 
provision, but no one really knows how to discern which one is 
applicable to any given case. There are two sections in the 
antidiscrimination provision, section 703, that state what may be 
different standards of causation (or motivation or something) 
section 703(a) "because of" and section 703(m) "motivating factor." 
No one knows if they truly are two different standards, 56 and if they 
are, how one decides which is applicable to any given case. 
Asymmetrically, the ADEA and the anti-retaliation provision of Title 
VII, section 704(a), have only the language "because of," which 
means but-for causation and precludes the applicability of the mixed-
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 177. 
52. Id. at 177-78. 
53. 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012). 
55. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533. 
56. The Supreme Court commented on the relationship between the two sections in EEOC 
v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). The Court stated that although 
"because of" means, "at a minimum, the traditional standard of but-for causation ... Title VII 
relaxes this standard ... to prohibit even making a protected characteristic a 'motivating factor' 
in an employment decision." Id. at 2032. 
-
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motives analysis. Most courts and lawyers think that the McDonnell 
Douglas pretext analysis applies to claims under the ADEA and Title 
VII's anti-retaliation provision, but the Supreme Court has reserved 
judgment on that issue regarding the ADEA17 and has not commentd 
on it in the context of anti-retaliation. The law applicable to the ADA 
probably is the same that is applicable to the ADEA and Title VII's 
anti-retaliation provision, meaning but-for causation, but that is far 
from certain." 
B. Mike Zimmer's Vision - A Uniform Analysis for Individual 
Disparate Treatment Claims Under All Federal Employment 
Discrimination Laws 
1. Zimmer Charts a Path Forward 
The Zimmer vision for improving employment discrimination 
law was laid out in his Georgia Law Review symposium article in 
1996.59 At that time, as chronicled above, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
had been enacted, and it appeared that it might make changes in the 
disparate treatment law that preceded it in which cases were analyzed 
under either McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse, depending on 
the type of evidence presented. However, as of 1996, the Supreme 
Court had not provided much guidance on what changes, if any, were 
wrought by the 1991 Act. Mike diagnosed the two most significant 
impediments to a clear and uniform analysis in individual disparate 
treatment law and, using two decisions of the Supreme Court in 1993, 
charted a way forward that would impose order. Unfortunately, those 
two most significant impediments persist to this day. 
The first problem had fully manifested itself at that time. It was 
that courts did not know how to determine which analysis, pretext or 
mixed motives, to apply in any given disparate treatment case 
because most cases actually involve presentation of circumstantial 
57. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
58. Based on Gross and Nassar, it would seem to be but-for. See Gentry v. E. W. Partners 
Club Mgmt. Co., Inc., 816 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2016) (joining 6th and 7th circuits in applying but-
for causation); Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying 
"but-for" causation to ADA claims in light of Gross); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 
591 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2010) (same). But see Hoffman v. Baylor Health Care Sys., 597 Fed. 
App'x 231 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct 45 (2015); Siring v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 
977 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (D. Or. 2013). 
59. Zimmer, supra note 5. Zimmer would further develop this vision and examine progress 
by the courts in Michael J. Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence: Individual Disparate Treatment 
Discrimination and the ADEA, 51 MERCER L. REV. 693 (2000). 
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and direct evidence and implicate more than one motive on the part 
of the employer for taking the adverse employment action.60 The 
second problem had not been fully realized at that time, but it did 
emerge in later years. It involved whether the amendments to Title 
VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be interpreted to apply to 
the ADEA and the ADA although the Act did not similarly amend 
those laws.61 
Mike considered the Supreme Court's two decisions in 1993, 
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins62 and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,63 
and found in them the seeds of a uniform analysis for individual 
disparate treatment cases. The cases at least modified the McDonnell 
Douglas pretext proof structure, and Mike wrote, they could be seen 
to "foreshadow the complete restructuring of individual disparate 
treatment discrimination law."' Although neither Biggins nor Hicks 
applied the amendments of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Mike saw in 
them an anticipation of broad application of the two-step analysis that 
the 1991 Act installed in Title VII: 1) plaintiff's prima facie case 
proves motivating factor, resulting in imposition of liability;65 and 2) 
defendant's partial defense - reduce the amount for which it is liable 
by proving that it would have made the same decision for 
nondiscriminatory reasons.66 Thus, Zimmer urged that what should 
emerge is a single two-part analysis.67 Second, he argued that the 
single analysis should be applied across the federal employment 
discrimination laws despite the fact that the 1991 Act inserted the 
two-part analysis into only Title VII.68 Mike asserted that, given the 
need for a uniform structure in disparate treatment law, Congress 
could not have intended otherwise.6 9 He also stated that the Supreme 
Court had worked to develop a uniform structure for all of individual 
disparate treatment law.o 
Mike's Georgia article was a clarion call for establishing a single, 
clear and uniform analysis or framework for all individual disparate 
60. Zimmer, supra note 5, at 583. 
61. Id. at 621-25. 
62. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
63. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
64. Zimmer, supra note 5, at 570. 
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012). 
66. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i). 
67. Zimmer, supra note 5, at 621. 
68. Id. at 621-25. 
69. Id. at 621-22. 
70. Id. at 622. 
-
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treatment claims. I think Mike recommended precisely what the 
Court and courts should do based on the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
Sadly, at this time only one smaller part of that vision has been 
advanced by the Supreme Court. As Mike predicted in the article, the 
dividing line between individual disparate treatment cases - direct 
evidence or circumstantial evidence - was eradicated by the Supreme 
Court in 2003 in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.7 ' However, even that 
small victory has proven ephemeral, as courts seem to have ignored 
Desert Palace and continue to distinguish between individual 
disparate treatment cases based on the type of evidence. 72 Moreover, 
the two principal impediments to a clear and uniform disparate 
treatment law remain. First, there is no single analysis that applies to 
all claims, and the question persists whether any given case is to be 
analyzed under McDonnell Douglas pretext or the statutory mixed-
motives analysis.73 Second, the Supreme Court, which Mike in the 
Georgia article credited for working to develop a uniform disparate 
treatment law across statutes, worked in the opposite direction in 
Gross and Nassar.4 As Mike argued, it seems fanciful to believe that 
what Congress intended to do in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was to 
create a statutory analysis that applies to only Title VII.' The 
Zimmer vision would have put employment discrimination law in a 
far better place. 
2. Examining the Evolving McDonnell Douglas Analysis with 
Patience and Hope 
Although Mike had charted a course forward that was not helped 
by retention of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the Supreme Court 
continued to work on that analysis. Mike examined the Court's 
efforts in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 76 Although 
many scholars were becomingly increasingly frustrated with the 
71. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
72. See William R. Corbett, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.: McDonnell Douglas to the 
Rescue?, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1683, 1691-92 (2015). 
73. See, e.g., Quigg v. Thomas Cty. Sch. Dist., 814 F. 3d 1227 (Ith Cir. 2016). The dilemma 
even prompted a Fifth Circuit panel to craft a "modified McDonnell Douglas approach" that 
fuses the pretext and mixed-motives analyses at stage three of the pretext analysis. Rachid v. 
Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F. 3d 305, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2004). 
74. See Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN STATE L. REV. 857, 857 (2010) ("The 
Supreme Court has done a turn-about on the value of uniformity in employment discrimination 
law."). 
75. Zimmer, supra note 5, at 621-25. 
76. 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
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retention of the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis, Mike patiently 
and hopefully considered the Court's efforts in Reeves to strengthen 
and preserve the pretext analysis in two articles." He concluded in the 
article he wrote for my school's law review symposium issue as 
follows: "If it is too early to know whether the full potential of Reeves 
will be realized, it is also too early to give up hope."" 
3. Finally, the Court Moves Toward the Zimmer Vision 
I think Mike's most optimistic article was his 2004 piece in the 
Emory Law Journal.79 In that article, Mike considered the 
implications of Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,o in which the Supreme 
Court held that direct evidence is not required to support a mixed-
motives jury instruction under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The 
decision adopted an argument that Mike had made in his Georgia 
article." The decision also seemed to clear away impediments for a 
single disparate treatment analysis applicable to at least Title VII, if 
not the ADEA and the ADA. Thus, Desert Palace appeared to 
remove at least one of the two major impediments to the Zimmer 
vision of a uniform individual disparate treatment law. Indeed, Mike 
wrote that "Desert Palace may revolutionize individual disparate 
treatment discrimination law."82 However, he also saw that lawyers, 
being the creatures of habit that they are, might resist the abrogation 
of an analysis with which they were so familiar. He wrote that defense 
and plaintiff attorneys may "share the feeling that the known devil of 
McDonnell Douglas is better than the unknown devil of section 
703(m)."8 3 His warning proved prescient. 
Although Desert Palace did not say it was doing away with the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis, it eliminated the line of demarcation 
between pretext and mixed motives. Many of us predicted that Desert 
Palace signaled the demise of McDonnell Douglas, and many of us 
were wrong. The Supreme Court did not expressly abrogate the 
77. Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. 
REV. 577 (2001) [hereinafter, Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing]; Michael J. Zimmer, Leading by 
Example: An Holistic Approach to Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 177 (2001). 
78. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing, supra note 77, at 603. 
79. Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither 
McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887 (2004). 
80. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
81. See text accompanying supra note 71. 
82. Zimmer, supra note 79, at 1889. 
83. Id. at 1942. 
317 2016]1 ZTMMER AND MCDONNELL DOUGLAS 
pretext analysis, and judges and lawyers clung to it tenaciously as 
Mike suspected they might. Thus, while most of us thought that 
Desert Palace signaled a dramatic move toward the Zimmer vision of 
disparate treatment law, we were wrong. The Court missed a singular 
opportunity to go far enough in Desert Palace to produce that result. 
4. Working Hard to Save the Vision 
As sweeping as his Georgia Law Review article had been in 
laying out the vison of a clear and uniform individual disparate 
treatment law, Mike's article in the University of Colorado Law 
Review was perhaps his most creative, as he struggled with the 
Court's decisions, to preserve hope for the vision.84 The article 
examined the state of the law several years after Reeves and Desert 
Palace were decided. Mike put forward three theses. First, the 
"because of" standard of section 703(a)(1)" and the "motivating 
factor" standard of section 703(m) 8 6 could be used at the parties' 
choice for any individual disparate treatment claim.' Second, the 
myth that all individual disparate treatment cases are either 
McDonnell Douglas cases or Price Waterhouse cases never has been 
correct." Third, the courts have recognized a variety of types of claims 
under individual disparate treatment.89 
It is amazing that Mike could remain optimistic about the state of 
the law at the time he wrote the Colorado article. And yet, the third 
thesis for which he argued, that there really are many recognizable 
types of claims that cannot be correctly categorized under either of 
the two analyses, may be the insight that someday leads to reform of 
disparate treatment law. Some courts have become frustrated with 
trying to fit evidence into the pretext framework and recognize that 
the framework does not present the ultimate issue in a disparate 
treatment case - whether the employer intentionally discriminated 
based on a protected characteristic. 90 
84. Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences Proving Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1243 (2008). 
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
86. Id. § 2000e-2(m). 
87. Zimmer, supra note 84, at 1247. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 1247-48. 
90. See, e.g., Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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5. Frustration 
Mike's more pessimistic articles on individual disparate 
treatment law were the two he published in 2014, and yet in each he 
concluded by suggesting a path forward to revitalize individual 
disparate treatment law. 
In his piece in the Nevada Law Journal's symposium on the 50th 
anniversary of Title VII,91 Mike harshly critiqued the Court's decision 
in Nassar in which the Court had held that the statutory mixed-
motives analysis under section 703 was not applicable to Title VII 
retaliation claims under section 704.2 The Court already had rejected 
the chance for a uniform analysis of individual disparate treatment 
claims across statues in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, in which it 
had held mixed motives inapplicable to the ADEA. 93 In Nassar, the 
Court had rejected a uniform analysis even within Title VII. 9 4 Mike 
explained that the Court's interpretation was at odds with the plain 
meaning of the statutory language and the structure of the statute.95 
In view of the Nassar decision and the movement so far from his 
vision of a uniform analysis for disparate treatment law, Mike 
concluded that realization of a broader vision may require 
congressional action given the Court's predilection "to slice and dice 
the law into insignificance." 96 At that point, Mike had reached 
agreement with a pessimist (me) as to what was needed to fix 
individual disparate treatment law.97 But, Mike had worked with the 
case law more patiently, constructively, and optimistically than I had 
before calling on Congress. 
In his 2014 article in the University of Chicago Legal Forum, 98 
Mike explained how the Roberts Court has diluted employment 
discrimination protections by both reducing the substantive 
protections and increasing the procedural barriers to relief.99 
91. Michael J. Zimmer, Hiding the Statute in Plain View: University of Texas Southwestern 
Medical Center v. Nassar, 14 NEV. L.J. 705 (2014). 
92. Id. at 705. 
93. 557 U.S. 167, 173 (2009). 
94. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct 2517, 2525-33. 
95. Zimmer, supra note 91, at 713. 
96. Id. at 722. 
97. Id. (citing William R. Corbett, Calling on Congress: Take a Page from Parliament's 
Playbook and Fix Employment Discrimination Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 135, 142-43 
(2013)). 
98. Michael J. Zimmer, Title VII's Last Hurrah: Can Discrimination Be Plausibly Pled?, 
2014 U. CHICAGO LEGAL F. 19. 
99. Id. at 21. 
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However, even within that broad context, Mike explained how it was 
possible for Ricci v. DiStefano00 to be developed so as to expand 
employment discrimination protection. In Ricci the Court had 
suggested that intentional discrimination can be proven by showing 
that the employer knew the racial consequences of its action. If the 
Court were serious about that issue, Mike saw a way to carry that 
forward to other cases (Ricci was a reverse race discrimination case) 
and thus "make lemonade out of the Ricci lemon."' It would 
establish a color-blind standard in which an employer's intent would 
be established by showing that it was aware of the racial 
consequences of its actions.1 Mike concluded, however, that based 
on other decisions of the Roberts Court that contracted employment 
discrimination protection through both procedure and substance, 
general extension of the Ricci version of intentional discrimination 
beyond the affirmative action/reverse discrimination context was 
unlikely. 1 03 
The article then explained how the Court has cut back on 
employment discrimination protections substantively and by raising 
procedural hurdles. Mike argued that plaintiffs should attempt to 
counteract those restrictions by pleading and attempting to prove the 
Ricci theory of intentional discrimination.'" If courts are not receptive 
to that effort to extend Ricci, Mike suggested four other approaches 
to reinvigorating employment discrimination law. First, the EEOC 
could become more active in litigation.o Second, expand legal 
services to plaintiffs without legal counsel who have meritorious 
claims of small value.106 While the first two alternatives could be seen 
as conservative measures that might be achieved without legislative 
action, the next two are more drastic. Third, replace the presumption 
of employment at will with a default rule of job security." Finally, 
Mike proposed creating a new forum to decide labor and employment 
disputes that would be largely independent of the judiciary.o 
By 2014, Mike had seen the trajectory of the employment 
100. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
101. Zimmer, supra note 98, at 45. 
102. Id. at 45-46. 
103. Id. at 56. 
104. Id. at 81. 
105. Id. at 91-92. 
106. Id. at 92. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 92-93. 
320 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 20:303 
discrimination decisions, and he was realistic in his assessment of how 
much the Court and courts had diminished the protections of the 
employment discrimination laws. Still, he took what the Court gave 
and tried to use it to mitigate the damage. But, importantly, he also 
began to look for agents of change beyond the courts and for creation 
of law beyond the scraps the Court was tossing out. He recognized 
that his efforts to craft expansive discrimination law from the case law 
were not yielding much of the lemonade he tried to squeeze out of 
the lemons. 
IV. KEEPING THE ZIMMER VISION ALIVE: COHERENCE AND 
UNIFORMITY IN INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT LAW 
The Supreme Court's development of individual disparate 
treatment law does not give much reason for optimism that a 
coherent, even-handed, and uniform body of law is likely to be 
developed by case law. Although Desert Palace presented a glimmer 
of hope, the Court said too little to effect a significant change to 
individual disparate treatment law. Gross created asymmetry of 
analysis among the statutes, and Nassar created asymmetry within 
Title VII. Thus, the last two decisions on proof structures and 
causation standards for intentional discrimination, Gross and Nassar, 
are antithetical to coherence and uniformity. Yet, there are promising 
signs and reasons for hope. Mike would squeeze lemonade, and I 
shall try. 
A. Hope for Congress 
Congress has not stepped in and significantly amended Title 
VII1 09 or the ADEA since the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the 1991 
amendments resulted in the Court's decisions in Desert Palace, Gross, 
and Nassar."o On the other hand, Congress did demonstrate its 
willingness to significantly amend legislation that is badly developed 
109. The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 is not the type of large-scale amendment that I am 
suggesting. See Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. The Ledbetter Act did amend all employment 
discrimination laws: Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (2012); the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.§ 626(d)(3) (2012); the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
12117(a) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5) (2012); and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 791, 794 (2012). However, its purpose was very limited - overturning the result in 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2, 123 Stat. 
at 5. 
110. See supra text accompanying notes 35-55. 
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by court decisions by enacting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. 
Still, what Congress does in most of its amendments of the 
employment discrimination laws is insert language intended to 
overturn specific Supreme Court decisions.112 What Congress should 
do is embark upon an overhaul of the employment discrimination 
laws informed by a review of the law by experts who know the 
problems in the current law and who are aware of the possibilities for 
reform.113 It is hard to be optimistic about the prospect for such 
extensive legislative reform, but again I will channel Mike's spirit, and 
remain hopeful. 
B. Hope for State Legislatures and Courts 
Mike raised the possibility of replacing employment at will with a 
form of job security.114 I must admit that I am not optimistic about 
state legislatures replacing employment at will, given that forty-nine 
of fifty states adhere to it."' Efforts to abrogate employment at will, 
other than in Montana, have not met with success, including the 
Model Employment Termination Act (META) promulgated by the 
Uniform Law Commission. The META, promulgated in 1991, has not 
been enacted by a single state.1 16 Regardless of whether any states 
generally abrogate employment at will, state legislatures and courts 
do many things that could improve employment discrimination law. 
Many states have enacted laws that extend employment 
discrimination protections beyond those afforded by federal law. 
State legislatures sometimes chart a course that Congress later 
follows, as in the case of genetic information nondiscrimination laws. 
More than thirty states enacted such laws1 . before Congress enacted 
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008.11s 
111. Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-54 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
12101 -12213 (2012)). 
112. See William R. Corbett, Calling on Congress: Take a Page from Parliament's Playbook 
and Fix Employment Discrimination Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 135, 136 (2013). 
113. Id. at 143-44. 
114. Zimmer, supra note 98, at 92. 
115. Forty-nine states are characterized as employment-at-will states. The Montana 
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act of 1987 removes that state from the list, although 
weakly. MONT. CODE ANN. 39-2-901 to -914 (2014). 
116. See MODEL EMP'T TERMINATION ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1991), available at 
<http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Employment`%20Termination/META final_91.pdf>. 
117. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Genetic Privacy Laws, http://www.ncsl. 
Org/IssuesResearch/Health/GeneticPrivacyLaws/tabid/14287/Default.aspx (last updated Mar. 
2008). 
118. Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified at scattered sections of 42, 29, and 26 
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Nineteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes 
prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual orientation 
and gender identity.119 An additional three states have enacted 
statutes prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual 
orientation but not gender identity.12 0 Several state legislatures have 
enacted laws generally prohibiting discrimination based on credit 
history,1 21 as have local legislative bodies. 12 2  The ban-the-box 
movement is further evidence that state and local legislative bodies 
can be active experimenters in supplementing federal employment 
discrimination law. Over 100 cities and counties and 24 states have 
adopted "ban the box" laws, which generally stated, prohibit 
employers from asking about arrests and criminal convictions on the 
initial application and until some point later in the interview 
process. 123 Such laws should have been a helpful adjunct to 
employment discrimination law, addressing claims that otherwise 
would present difficult disparate impact issues,1 but recent studies 
indicate that the laws actually may decrease the probability of low-
wage African American and Hispanic men being hired. 1 25 Although 
the ban-the-box initiative ultimately may culminate in a finding that 
such laws are not worth the unintended consequences, state and local 
legislative bodies nonetheless took the initiative to try to address a 
problem of discrimination. 
State courts interpreting state employment discrimination laws 
generally have looked to the federal courts' interpretations of the 
federal statutes for guidance and adopted identical interpretations of 
U.S.C.). 
119. See https://www.aclu.org/map/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map 
(visited Nov. 4, 2016). 
120. Id. 
121. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Use of Credit Information in 
Employment 2015 Legislation, available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-
commerce/use-of-credit- information-in-employment-2015-legislation.aspx. 
122. See, e.g., Michael Bologna, Cook County Bars Bias Against Employees and Job 
Applicants Based on Previous Credit History, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 98, at A-8 (May 21, 
2015). 
123. See National Employment Law Project, at http://www.nelp.org/publication/ban-the-
box-fair-chance-hiring-state-and-local-guide/. Louisiana passed a ban-the-box law applicable to 
state employers in 2016. La. R.S. 42:1701. 
124. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in 
Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, No. 915.002 (Apr. 25, 
2012), available at https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrestconviction.cfm. 
125. See Alana Semuels, When Banning One Kind of Discrimination Results in Another, 
THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2016), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016 
/08/consequences-of-ban-the-box/494435/. 
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parallel state laws.126 However, in an increasing number of cases, state 
courts have adopted divergent interpretations of state statutes.1 27 
Some of the divergent interpretations are attributable to differences 
in the statutory language, but some are due to the state courts' 
disagreement with the federal courts' interpretation. 128 For example, 
some state courts have found the holding of Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, Inc. 129 inapplicable to the causation standard under the state 
age discrimination laws, principally because of differences in the 
federal and state statutes.13 
The state legislatures and courts are not constrained by federal 
employment discrimination law on matters of state law, and 
innovation and experimentation at the state level may help 
reinvigorate federal law. 
C. Hope for the Supreme Court 
While the Supreme Court's individual disparate treatment 
decisions have not moved appreciably in the direction of the Zimmer 
vision of coherence and symmetry, I will be like Mike and look for 
something positive in the recent cases. Two Supreme Court cases 
from 2015 that addressed discrimination issues were generally 
positive for plaintiffs and for expanding the protection of federal 
employment discrimination law: Young v. United Parcel Service, 
Inc.131 and EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. 31 2 
In Young, the Court reversed lower court decisions granting a 
summary judgment against a plaintiff who sued her employer for not 
granting her an accommodation of light-duty job reassignment during 
her pregnancy, although the employer so accommodated employees 
disabled in other ways.133 The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument 
that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 34 requires employers to make 
126. See generally Alex B. Long, "If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .": Divergent 
Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 469, 
477 (2006). 
127. Id. at 473-74. 
128. Id. at 484-85. 
129. 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
130. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Village of Breckenridge, No. 08-14559-BC, 2009 WL 3273255 (E.D. 
Mich. Oct. 9, 2009); West Va. American Water Co. v. Nagy, No. 101229, 2011 WL 8583425 (W. 
Va. June 15, 2011). 
131. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
132. 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). 
133. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344. 
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
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workplace accommodations for pregnant workers that it makes for 
workers disabled in other ways that have a similar effect on inability 
to work. 1 35 Although rejecting the plaintiff's proposed statutory 
interpretation1 36 (as well as the defendant employer's argument that 
the PDA does nothing more than clarify that pregnancy 
discrimination is a type of sex discrimination), the Court went on to 
hold that a pregnant employee could prove intentional discrimination 
based on non-accommodation by using the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis. 137 The majority described the analysis as proceeding in the 
following way. First, the plaintiff would establish a prima facie case by 
proving that she belongs to a protected class, she sought an 
accommodation, and the employer denied the accommodation, 
although it did accommodate others similarly able or unable to 
work. 138  Next, the employer would give a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for denying the accommodation, but that 
reason normally could not be that accommodating pregnant women 
was more expensive or less convenient. 139 Finally, the plaintiff would 
prove the employer's reason was pretextual, and a jury question could 
be created on this issue, by producing sufficient evidence that the 
employer's policy actually imposes a significant burden on pregnant 
women - a burden which cannot be justified by the given legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason and which permits an inference of 
discrimination.14 0 Furthermore, the plaintiff can establish a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding imposition of a significant burden at 
stage three by presenting evidence that the employer accommodates a 
large percentage of nonpregnant employees and fails to accommodate 
a large percentage of pregnant employees. 141 
I have criticized the Court for crafting a bizarre analysis based on 
McDonnell Douglas, which I and others think the Court needs to lay 
to rest.142 Nonetheless, I do recognize that the Court created an 
analysis that saved the plaintiff's claim from summary judgment and 
offered a way for plaintiffs in future pregnancy nonaccommodation 
cases to avoid summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law.143 
135. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1349. 
136. Id. at 1349-50. 
137. Id. at 1353-54. 
138. Id. at 1354. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 1354-55. 
142. Corbett, supra note 72. 
143. See, e.g., Legg v. Ulster County 820 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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In Abercrombie & Fitch, the Court reversed an appellate court 
decision granting summary judgment for an employer on the EEOC's 
claim that a job applicant was discriminatorily not hired and not 
accommodated because she was a Muslim and wore a hijab to her 
interview, which would not conform to the employer's workplace 
dress code.144 The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff does not have 
to prove, as part of her prima facie case, that an employer has 
knowledge of her religion.145 What Title VII requires is that a plaintiff 
prove that religion was a motivating factor for the employer's adverse 
action.14 6 The Court did not decide whether a plaintiff must at least 
prove that an employer suspects a religious belief and practice in 
order to establish motivating factor; rather, the Court said the 
principle was arguable, but it was unnecessary to resolve the issue in 
the case before it.147 The Court also rejected the idea that there is a 
separate and distinct failure-to-accommodate-religion claim; instead, 
a claim of that type must be a disparate treatment or disparate impact 
claim. 148 The Court's reticence on the necessity of proving suspicion of 
religion is unhelpful. More concerning is the Court's elimination of 
the distinct failure-to-accommodate claim. The distinct claim 
provided additional protection against discrimination based on 
religion. However, overall the opinion must be considered favorable 
to discrimination victims, as it permitted the EEOC to proceed with 
its claim in the case and should help other plaintiffs claiming 
discrimination based on religion survive summary judgment. 
Young and Abercrombie & Fitch are favorable results for 
plaintiffs and civil rights advocates regarding proof of discrimination 
- substantive employment discrimination law. 
In the two most recent terms, the Court also has rendered other 
decisions of a more general procedural nature that are favorable to 
more expansive discrimination protection. Mike expressed concern 
about the procedural barriers being erected by the Court in his article 
in the University of Chicago Legal Forum,149 so this recent movement 
by the Court in the other direction is noteworthy. In Mach Mining v. 
144. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031-32 (2015). 
145. Id. at 2032. 
146. Id. at 2032-33. 
147. Id. at 2033 n.3. 
148. Id. at 2032 ("These two proscriptions, often referred to as the 'disparate treatment' (or 
'intentional discrimination') provision and the 'disparate impact' provision, are the only causes 
of action under Title VII."). 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 98-108. 
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EEOC,1so while holding that employers could challenge the EEOC's 
performance of its statutory duty to conciliate cases, the Court 
announced a standard of review that is very favorable to the EEOC. 
In Green v. Brennan, the Court held that a constructive discharge 
claim does not accrue, and applicable filing periods do not commence, 
until the employee gives notice of resignation rather than when the 
last discriminatory act of the employer occurs.152 
One more recent Supreme Court decision deserves attention. 
Although it is a case under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state 
wage law, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,153 is the first favorable 
decision for plaintiffs in an employment class action in some time. 
The decision permits certification of a class and collective action 
based on statistical or representative evidence (averaging of unpaid 
donning and doffing time).154 The Court in Tyson Foods explained 
and limited its rejection in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes... of what it 
labeled "Trial by Formula." The Court clarified that the question of 
admissibility when such evidence is offered in a class action is 
whether it could have been relied upon to establish liability in 
individual actions.156 The Court did not establish a broad rule 
regarding the admissibility of representative evidence in class actions 
but instead stated that the admissibility of statistical evidence 
depends on the purpose for which it is offered and the elements of the 
underlying cause of action."' While the repercussions of the decision 
are difficult to forecast, the case can be seen as a sea change, with 
Justice Kennedy, who was on the side of no class certification in many 
recent opinions, writing the majority opinion in Tyson Foods.5 
150. 135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015). 
151. The Court described what the EEOC must do to satisfy its obligation. First, it must 
inform the employer of the alleged discriminatory act and identify which employees have 
suffered as a result, which the EEOC typically does in a "reasonable cause" letter. Id. at 1655-
56. Then the EEOC must attempt to engage the employer in oral or written discussion to give 
the employer an opportunity to remedy its allegedly discriminatory practice. Id. at 1656. The 
"barebones" judicial review is limited to those requirements. An affidavit of the EEOC 
asserting that it satisfied the obligations usually suffices to show satisfaction of the statutory 
duty unless an employer provides credible evidence to the contrary by countervailing affidavit 
or otherwise. If an employer provides such evidence, a court must conduct factfinding under the 
narrow standard of review. If a court finds a violation by the EEOC, the remedy is to order the 
EEOC to fulfill its duty. Id. 
152. 136 S. Ct. 1769 (2016). 
153. 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016). 
154. Id. at 1045-47. 
155. 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
156. Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1046-47. 
157. Id. at 1046. 
158. See Perry Cooper, Kennedy's Move Left on Class Actions Called "Watershed," Daily 
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D. Hope for the Lower Federal Courts 
The lower federal courts continue to struggle with the law of 
individual disparate treatment, but there are reasons to be optimistic 
about some of their efforts in this chaotic area. Of course, one or 
more of those cases should eventually make its way up to the 
Supreme Court. Consider, for example, the Eleventh Circuit's recent 
effort in Quigg v. Thomas County School District.15 9 The court 
addressed the issue of whether the McDonnell Douglas pretext proof 
structure is the appropriate one for analyzing at the summary 
judgment stage a claim based on circumstantial evidence. The court 
held that the two-stage mixed-motives analysis is appropriate, and 
McDonnell Douglas is not because it is overly burdensome. 16 0 I think, 
and Mike would think, the Quigg opinion makes a couple of 
significant errors. First, it maintains a distinction between mixed-
motives cases and single-motive cases. While that dichotomy is 
supported by the case law, it is almost certainly an incorrect 
characterization of employers' decision making. 16 1 Second, the 
distinction between cases based on direct evidence and those based 
on circumstantial evidence is an ethereal demarcation that should not 
have survived Desert Palace.62 Yet, notwithstanding those missteps, 
the Eleventh Circuit reached a good result of applying the statutory 
mixed-motives analysis rather than the McDonnell Douglas pretext 
analysis to evaluate a case at summary judgment. 
An even more promising recent decision is one by a Seventh 
Circuit panel in Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. 163 In that case, the 
court reversed a summary judgment in a discrimination case in which 
the district court had divided evidence between the direct and indirect 
methods of proving discrimination and determined that the plaintiff 
failed to create a "convincing mosaic of discrimination" under either 
method. First the appellate court explained that the "convincing 
mosaic" trope, articulated by the court in Troupe v. May Dept. Stores 
Co., 1 64 was intended to be a metaphor for a court's consideration of 
the evidence rather than a new test that had to be satisfied by 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 68, at A-4 (Apr. 8, 2016). 
159. 814 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016). 
160. Id. at 1237. 
161. See, e.g., Zimmer, supra note 79, at 1923-28. 
162. Id. at 1912-14. 
163. 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016). 
164. 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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plaintiffs.165 Instead, in the aftermath of Troupe, courts treated it as a 
new test. The Ortiz court reiterated that "convincing mosaic" is not a 
legal test and overruled a series of Seventh Circuit cases to the extent 
that they relied on it as a legal test. 166 Next, the Ortiz court trained its 
sights on the direct and indirect methods of proving discrimination 
and declared that courts must cease from classifying evidence as 
direct or indirect and treating such evidence as subject to distinct 
approaches.167 The court stated that the legal standard is "simply 
whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to 
conclude that the plaintiff's race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other 
proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment 
action. 168 "Evidence is evidence," the court declared, and should be 
considered as a whole. 169 To that point in the opinion, the Seventh 
Circuit panel had done some very fine work, doing what Mike 
recommended and what we thought the Supreme Court already had 
done in Desert Palace. However, next the court asserted that all that it 
had said did not affect the McDonnell Douglas framework or "any 
other burden-shifting framework, no matter what it is called as a 
shorthand."o So, although the court professed to want a unified 
analysis, it was unwilling to explain the relationship between the 
pretext and mixed-motives proof structures, ending much as the 
Supreme Court did in Desert Palace. However, the court did go on to 
assess the evidence under the standard it stated - whether a 
reasonable juror could infer that the employer took the adverse 
action based on ethnicity, and under that standard, reversed the 
summary judgment."' Although the Seventh Circuit panel flinched in 
Ortiz, based on its reverence for McDonnell Douglas, rather than 
solve the two-proof-structure conundrum, it produced one of the 
most hopeful and promising decisions of a federal appellate court.172 
Its rejection of the direct-indirect-evidence dichotomy and its focus 
on the ultimate question of discrimination in assessing the evidence 
on a summary judgment motion are encouraging signs. There is in the 
court's opinion a clear desire to move to a single analysis. 
165. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764. 
166. Id. at 765. 
167. Id. at 765-66. 
168. Id. at 765. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 766. 
171. Id. 
172. Professor Bent also sees Ortiz as providing reason for optimism. See Bent, supra note 
10, at 295-97. 
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Even though the law of individual disparate treatment is largely 
incoherent and chaotic and nothing like Mike's vision for what it can 
and should be, Mike would find reasons to be optimistic and to 
provide tools for the Court and courts to improve the law. In this 
Part, I have tried to squeeze some lemonade. However, he also might 
think now that the better approach, given the scope of the repair and 
the Court's reluctance to undertake it, would be congressional 
intervention.1 3 
V. CONCLUSION 
I miss Mike Zimmer as a person, a friend, a mentor, a co-author, 
a teacher, and a scholar. I missed being able to send him a draft of 
this article before submitting it. But I know that I am a far better 
scholar, teacher, colleague, and person for having known Mike. I also 
know that the law is far better because of Mike's contributions. The 
vision he crafted for individual disparate treatment law was the law as 
it should be. The courts and Congress have not moved the law there 
yet. But Mike would continue working with what they gave him and 
believing that it would get better. In honor of Mike, I am going to 
keep that hope alive. And yes, Mike, once again, you are correct that 
McDonnell Douglas is the gift that keeps giving. I am grateful that 
you kept giving your gifts to the very end and that you continue to 
give through your brilliant scholarship and your many colleagues and 
friends who are influenced by you and your ideas. 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97. 
